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So REASON CAN RULE. By Scott Buchanan. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux. 1982. Pp. vii, 321. cloth $12.95; paper $5.95.
So Reason Can Rule collects thirteen essays on law and politics by Scott
Buchanan, the late educator and philosopher. 1 The book displays
Buchanan's extensive knowledge of Western intellectual heritage, drawing
on sources from nearly all Western cultures since Classical Greece. Although written over a 15 year period, the essays together present a coherent,
readable version of what Buchanan viewed as society's fundamental political problems and a prescription for refo:m.
Buchanan aligns himself with the social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The principle of consent and federalism
underlie much of his political thought. "Democracy as self-government or
government by the consent of the governed, is not one of many forms of
government," Buchanan states. Echoing several social contract theorists,2
he claims, "[I]t is a principle of all government; governments derive their
just power from the consent of the governed" (p. 69). The United States
Constitution, according to Buchanan, confirms this principle (p. 185).
Buchanan also adopts the views of Montesquieu, who observed that "[i]t is
natural for a republic to have only a small territory," 3 and thus that a large
territory or population would have to employ the federal principle in creating a republic (pp. 39, 150).
These two principles also lie at the foundation of Buchanan's proposal
for political reform - to grant charters to all private, voluntary associations, corporations, and institutions, to grant them the power of self-government, and to coordinate these chartered institutions according to a federal
scheme (pp. 168-76). Buchanan proposes that a "subconstitutional federation [of these organizations] be set up, or imagined, as a new branch of
government, independent and autonomous . . . ." (p. 176). In other words,
Buchanan envisions establishing a federation in which such organizations
have a status roughly equivalent to that afforded the States in the present
scheme.
Buchanan advances this striking proposal in response to two perceived
I. Mr. Buchanan died in 1973. He is best known for establishing the "New Program" at St.
Johns College, Annapolis, Maryland and Sante Fe, New Mexico, commonly known as the

"Great Books" program. Buchanan was concerned that prevailing trends in education were
not properly preparing students for life as citizens and were ignoring the intellectual foundations of our society. Accordingly, Buchanan, in conjunction with other notable educators such
as Robert Maynard Hutchins, designed a curriculum in selected great books in fields such as
classical and modem languages, mathematics and natural sciences. This book, the first in a
planned series, was assembled for publication by a committee of Buchanan's friends, colleagues, and students, in an effort to bring his work to a wider audience. Pp. xi-xii. See also
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, THE ST. JOHN'S PROGRAM v (1955); N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1968, at 41, col.
I.

2. For writings of major seventeenth and eighteenth century social contract theorists, see T,
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 129-45 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-77 (P. Laslett ed.1960); J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 7
(G. Cole trans. 1950).
3. C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 120 (T, Nugent trans. 1949).
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problems: first, the demise of reason, and the substitution of self-interest, in
the legislative process; second, the failure of the present scheme of self-government to educate the citizenry.
Writing on the demise of reason, Buchanan declares that "[u]nder our
Constitution the law divides itself so that reason can rule" (p. 228). In other
words: "Following Locke and Montesquieu, the Constitution distinguishes
three great offices, powers, or functions: the legislature, the executive, and
the judiciary; and to them are assigned respectively three uses of practical
reason: the making of laws, the executing or administration of laws, and
the adjudication of laws" (p. 198). Reason was to function in each of these
branches. Courts, for example, add reasons to the interests of the parties (p.
62). The Constitution, for Buchanan, protects members of the legislature
from the influence of interests and powers that might impair the use of
reason (p. 63). On the executive level, administrative agencies are empowered to hold hearings at which parties will present reasons for a particular
ruling (p. 63). Thus, the potential for reason to rule exists in every branch of
government.
According to Buchanan, however, this potential remains largely unrealized. The drafters of the Constitution did not anticipate the rise of the corporation, party politics, and lobbying (pp. 87-88). ''To the eighteenthcentury mind, which sought to ensure its liberties by separating governmental powers and trusting them to rational debate, the addition of economic
powers, money, industry, and welfare to the fragile political forms of the
republic is letting the bull loose in the china shop" (p. 96). One reason a
republic can exist only in a small territory, according to Montesquieu, is
that in a small territory the common good is easier to discem.4 Buchanan,
then, proposes that the federalist principle be extended to all associations so
that reason, with a view to the common good (as opposed to the interests of
powerful groups), can rule.
As for the failure of the present scheme of self-government to educate
the citizenry, Buchanan writes that the
Founding Fathers all learned through their tutors what Montesquieu had
said, that the principle of the republican form of government is political
virtue, and that the source of such virtue is education . . . . They did their
best to give this country the basic and comprehensive legal structure that
would make the day-to-day life and work of the citizen and the officials
self-educative.5
.
In Buchanan's view the citizens of a republic are educated in part by
participating in the process of self-government: "[T]he laws are the teachers, and . . . the making, obeying, and remaking of laws is the essence of
collective self-education" (p. 20). In a society as large as our own, citizen
participation in self-government, and thus in the process of self-education,
is minimal. By extending self-government, under a federal scheme, to all
private voluntary associations, presumably citizen participation in self-government and the self-educative process would increase. Participation in
4. Id.
5. P. 21. The Montesquieu passage alluded to can be found in C. MONTESQUIEU, supra
note 3, at 34.
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tum instills political virtue, the principle of republican government, in the
citizens.
Thus, as far as it goes, the political philosophy expressed in So Reason
Can Rule is well-integrated. Governments derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed: self-government is the principle of all government. Through participation in self-government, citizens acquire political
virtue, which is the principle of self-government. In a large society, not
only is citizen participation and self-education minimal, but the common
good is hard to discern. Economics and political interest, not reason, become the dominant influences on law-making. Chartering public and private organizations, and thereby granting iliem powers of self-government,
and coordinating them under a federal scheme, responds to these problems.
The main problem with this political philosophy is one that Buchanan
was aware of when he stated: "I confess I have no detailed blueprint" (p.
177).6 Even this candid admission may be understated. One has to wonder:
Are for-profit corporations really to be allowed to govern themselves, and
given powers comparable to those of States? Certain passages suggest that
this is indeed what Buchanan intended: "[I]t would be interesting to see if
replacing the Sherman antitrust law by the ensurance of a republican form
of government to all private corporations would . . . hasten the present
tendency of the business corporation to accept more community responsibilities" (p. 98). Granting private corporations the powers of self- government might just as easily hasten their tendency to ignore community needs.
Perhaps unchecked self-government by for-profit corporations is not intended (pp. 176-77), but _as it stands, So Reason Can Rule admits of this
interpretation.
Another detail left to the reader's imagination is whether for-profit corporations in this scheme will be managed democratically. This would impose a significant cost in terms of economic efficiency. The management
and ownership of corporations were originally separated because distributing all information relevant to every particular decision to all owners, or
citizens of the newly chartered corporation in this case, is expensive. Additional expense could be expected to accrue from organizing citizens whenever a decision is at hand. Further, the average citizen cannot be expected
to have the education or skills of professional management.7
A final difficulty with So Reason Can Rule relates to a characterization
of the ideal state of affairs. Elaborating on Kant, 8 Buchanan asserts that
"all good laws must be rules of reason within a kingdom of nature, or ends
in which men are masters or the ends-in-themselves" (p. 309). Though men
are to be ends-in-themselves, Buchanan implies that the United States
should establish this kingdom of ends in undeveloped countries (pp. 15,
320). To impose a form of government on a people is inconsistent with
6. For a more detailed proposal, see R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE
GIANT CORPORATION (1976). See also, Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. LJ. U3 (1972).
7. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against JJefensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 834 (1981).
8. See generally, I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck trans.

1959).
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treating them as ends-in-themselves. Though self-government may be the
best form of government, a nation must adopt this form on its own. Otherwise, the nation's citizens have not consented to the government, and its
authority, on Buchanan's own premises, would not be legitimate.
So Reason Can Rule presents an interesting and coherent, albeit somewhat general, political philosophy that accommodates the modem corporation, in whatever form, within traditional natural law and social contract
theory. The several essays collected in the book also describe the function
of law in a government such as that established by our Constitution. The
principle difficulty with the book, perhaps attributable to the fact that it is a
collection of essays, is the highly abstract level at which the exposition of
political philosophy proceeds. For the lawyer seeking the answer to a particular practical problem, the book is unlikely to be of help. But for those
wishing to contemplate the function oflaw under our Constitution, So Reason Can Rule makes thought-provoking reading.

